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Abstract:  I here critique the application of the traditional, similarity-based account of natural 
kinds to debates in psychology.  A challenge to such accounts of kindhood—familiar from the 
study of biological species—is a metaphysical phenomenon that I call ‘transitional gradation’: 
the systematic progression of slightly modified transitional forms between related candidate 
kinds.  Where such gradation proliferates, it renders the selection of similarity criteria for kinds 
arbitrary.  Reflection on general features of learning—especially on the gradual revision of 
concepts throughout the acquisition of expertise—shows that even the strongest candidates for 
similarity-based kinds in psychology exhibit systematic transitional gradation.  As a result, 
philosophers of psychology should abandon discussion of kindhood, or explore non-similarity 
based accounts. 
1.  Introduction:  The Similarity Thesis 
A fundamental idea about natural kinds is that their members are mutually similar, so much 
so that Quine even suggested ‘the notion of a kind and the notion of similarity or resemblance 
seem to be variants or adaptations of a single notion’ ([1994], p. 42).  The similarity that kind 
members bear to one another is thought to account in part for kinds’ scientific import.  For one, it 
will be rational to infer the properties of the entire kind from the properties of a sample, because 
the members of the sample and the members of the whole population will be similar in 
scientifically important respects; for another, there will be many true generalizations ‘out there 
waiting to be discovered’ about categories whose members are similar in many different ways. 
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Moreover, sciences describing domains containing many distinct kinds will be good subjects for 
taxonomy, for if two kinds are distinct, then the way in which members of one kind are similar 
will differ from the way in which members of another kind are similar, and members of different 
kinds can be distinguished by these characteristic similarities.  Let us call this set of ideas the 
Similarity Thesis (hereafter ‘ST’); to summarize, 
The Similarity Thesis:  A natural kind is scientifically important in virtue of a 
distinctive similarity shared amongst all and only members of the kind. 
The relevant notion of similarity, however, has proven notoriously difficult to characterize; 
Quine himself worried that it is of ‘dubious scientific standing’ and ‘logically repugnant’ 
([1994], pp. 42-43). Specifically, members of kinds might be held similar in different ways, to 
different degrees, and at different levels of description, and it is not clear which types of 
similarity should be required for kindhood.
1
  
Notably, categories which grade into one another present special challenges to ST, for 
category divisions with transitional borderline cases frustrate our attempts to locate precise and 
distinctive metrics of similarity characterizing members of each kind.  In the philosophy of 
biology, this problem has been acknowledged in the case of species.  Though Putnam and Kripke 
offered tigers, beech trees, and Homo sapiens as paradigm examples of natural kinds (locating 
their essential similarity in shared genetic codes), ST has been heavily criticized in the species 
debate due to the fact that systematic heritable variation and gradual change—at phenotypic, 
genotypic, and epigenetic levels of description—are required for natural selection to occur.  As a 
result, biologists have discovered many transitional forms between related species, and this 
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 See also Magnus ([2011]) for a critical discussion of the hold that ST has had on the theory of 
kinds in biology. 
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systematic proliferation of borderline cases persistently embarrasses any attempt to identify 
characteristic forms of similarity for each species.  Synchronic cases of transitional gradation can 
be found most dramatically in the cases of species rings (Figure 1) and other forms of cryptic 
species complexes; but if we expand our interest diachronically to evolutionary time scales, 
every species will blur into its phylogenetic forebears via a variety of transitional forms.   
 
Figure 1.  Common example of a species ring involving seagulls around the Arctic Circle.  Larus 
fuscus (1) blends into its distinct Siberia population (2), which blends into Larus heuglini (3), 
Larus argentatus birulai (4), Larus vegae (5), Larus smithsonianus (6), and Larus argentatus (7).  
Each population can hybridize with its neighbors, but Larus fuscus and Larus argentatus are 
phenotypically distinct, genotypically distinct, and cannot successfully interbreed.  (Image 
source:  Wikimedia Commons, S. Solberg.) 
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To be clear, the difficulty is not just that a few hard cases exist—we could grant ST 
exception for even a large number of tricky borderline cases, if it worked for the less complex 
cases.  The point is rather that the hard cases expose the inadequacy of ST even in the 
supposedly easy ones.  Nomologically, there is nothing abnormal about cryptic species 
complexes, and all other species exhibit the same forms of intrapopulation variation to less 
dramatic degrees.
2
  Furthermore, the most serious challenge to ST in systematics is not the mere 
existence of variation, but rather the fact that heritable variation and gradual change is a primary 
mechanism by which natural selection occurs ([Sober [1980]).  This is a resilient and subtle 
problem; though there are a variety of devices that could be used to bracket off or abstract away 
from this variation, its existence is required to explain, through speciation, how species members 
came to possess the properties that they do.  As a result, all such devices must fail.  In short, ST 
seeks to establish species as natural kinds to secure their explanatory legitimacy in biology, but 
any device that successfully abstracted away from the gradation that threatens species’ kindhood 
would rob them of the very feature by which they participate in one of biology’s central 
explanatory projects. 
While controversy still surrounds this challenge to the kindhood of species, there is no doubt 
that it presents a serious complication, with many philosophers of biology having lost faith in the 
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 Of course, some mechanisms and pressures favor genetic and phenotypic homogeneity.  Others, 
however, favor heterogeneity.  The point is that there is no general law about species as such that 
secures homogeneity and for which ring species would have to be regarded as nomologically 
deviant. 
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ability of ST to arbitrate taxonomic disputes.
3
 By contrast, the theory of natural kinds in 
philosophy of psychology—especially variants of the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view, 
which holds kindhood to be determined by an accommodation between a characteristic set of 
properties and underlying mechanisms that cause those properties to non-accidentally cluster in 
category members
4—is currently enjoying a surge in popularity.  One of the most prominent 
recent debates, centering around the work of Machery [2009], questions whether concepts are an 
HPC kind—on the assumption that any posit found not to be a natural kind should be eliminated 
from psychology.  Instead, Machery recommends that psychologists focus attention on the 
genuine natural kinds in this area of study, which he takes to be the major subtypes of concepts: 
prototypes, exemplars, and theories. 
I here urge caution, on the grounds that the subject matter of psychology, like that of biology, 
involves a proliferation of explanatorily-important transitional forms.  This will be old news to 
some philosophers of psychology and especially philosophers of psychiatry, who have long 
argued that transitional forms between mental illnesses (such as anxiety and depression) stymie 
essentialist approaches to psychological kinds (Zachar [2000]; Haslam [2002]).
5
  My goal here is 
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 It should be noted that several new approaches have recently been offered to the ‘species 
problem’ that are designed to rely less on distinctive similarities—such as, Ereshefsky & 
Matthen’s ([2005]) ‘population structure theory’. 
4
 In the interests of space, I here do not elaborate on the nature of accommodation; for more see 
Boyd ([1999]). 
5
 The clearest case so far is depression, where large, replicated empirical studies have failed to 
find any evidence of an underlying discontinuity between normal unhappiness and depressive 
disorders—see Ruscio and Ruscio ([2000], p. 2002). 
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thus not merely to demonstrate the existence of transitional forms in psychology—which should 
by now be obvious.  Rather, my aim is to understand this challenge in its most general form (as 
applying to any similarity-based account of natural kinds, rather than narrowly against 
essentialist approaches) and to press it against some of the strongest candidates for such kinds in 
psychology (in particular, prototypes and exemplars).  The argument, moreover, will generalize 
to any gradually-modified representational state, extending the concerns about transitional forms 
in psychology well beyond the commonly discussed examples in philosophy of psychiatry. In so 
doing, I problematize the eliminativist style of argument favored by authors like Machery—for if 
even the standard sub-types of concept (such as prototypes, ideal models, and exemplars) fail to 
count as natural kinds in the relevant sense, this assumption would lead to an ‘eliminative 
regress’ that would remove from consideration large swathes of psychology’s subject matter.  
Psychology must talk about something, so if the threat posed by transitional forms applies so 
broadly, this outcome would serve as a reductio of the use of similarity-based kindhood as a 
yardstick for legitimacy in psychology. 
To make this case, I offer a general treatment of the metaphysical challenge presented by 
transitional forms (Section 2), and argue that this type of situation will also routinely appear in a 
core area of psychology, the study of concepts (Section 3).  Finally, I explain why these 
transitional forms are explanatorily central to psychology, so no attempt to abstract away from 
them can succeed without serious costs (Section 4). My specific arguments here appeal to 
psychological theories about the structure of concepts—roughly, hypotheses about the ‘bodies of 
knowledge retrieved by default when categorizing, reasoning, drawing analogies, making 
inductions, and so on’ (Machery [2010]).  My key premise is that learning is a process of gradual 
modification and selection that will—like random mutation and natural selection in evolution—
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systematically introduce a series of intermediate forms between standard types of concept such 
as prototypes and ideal models.  As a result, ST will face serious challenges when applied to 
taxonomic disputes (i.e. ‘lump or split?’) debates in the psychology of concepts.  
A note before beginning:  writing about the scientific categories psychologists deploy in the 
study of their subjects’ categorization procedures presents special terminological challenges.  To 
pre-empt possible confusion, the central thesis of this article concerns the question as to whether 
the category CONCEPT, understood as a class of mental representations (a category whose 
extension includes individual concepts like SPOON, TREE, ELECTRON, MOTHER, etc.), forms one or 
a small number of similarity-based natural kinds in psychology.  This concern should be strictly 
distinguished from worries about the natural kind status of any particular concept, like 
CHIMPANZEE, (a category whose extension includes individual chimpanzees like Washoe, Ai, 
Kanzi, Nim Chimpsky, etc.).  We will discuss the natural kind status of some particular species 
concepts (such as CHIMPANZEE) in Section 2, but only as an analogy for the way that transitional 
gradation amongst conceptual structures can pose challenges to similarity-based approaches to 
psychological kinds. Just as transitional gradation amongst species members might pose a 
problem for the natural kind status of a particular species concept like CHIMPANZEE in biology, I 
claim, so will it pose problems for the natural kind status of the general category CONCEPT in 
psychology.  With this all kept in mind, let us begin. 
2. Transitional Gradation 
 Let ‘gradation’ between putative kinds name the metaphysical situation in which the 
extension of one category blurs into the extension of another category or categories without an 
obvious dividing line.  The simplest case occurs when we have two candidate kinds, A and B, 
with A characterized by a set of property values Pa and B characterized by the disjoint set of 
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property values Pb, and in nature individuals can be arranged along a continuum from instances 
displaying mostly Pa, to instances displaying a mixture of Pa and Pb, to finally instances 
displaying mostly Pb.  This simple scheme can be complicated in a variety of ways depending 
upon the subject matter.  The properties involved can be binary (for example, ‘has a tail’), 
monotonic (‘height’), multivalent (‘color’), or complex (‘spotted’).  While the continuum might 
be unidimensional, it will more typically be multi-dimensional (with variation in values for many 
different properties).  Whatever complications are introduced, gradation so defined will come in 
degrees, depending upon how clustered instances are in multi-dimensional property space in 
roughly the ways suggested by the putative kind groupings.  Gradation will furthermore be 
‘transitional’ when there are systematic uni- or bi-directional processes of modification (such as 
evolution, development, or learning) that govern the gradation of individuals from one to another 
putative kind(s).  The severity of transitional gradation as a threat to the (distinct) kindhood of A 
and B is determined by how numerous and important are the cases lying in the middle portion of 
the continuum, and how explanatorily central the transitional processes and instances are to the 
discipline(s) in which A and B are candidate kinds. 
 Rather than focusing on traditional essentialist notions of kindhood—which, due to their 
association with necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership, have become an easy 
target in the life sciences—these issues may be more generally understood by focusing on the 
account of natural kinds more commonly invoked by philosophers of psychology, homeostatic 
property cluster (HPC) theory.  According to Boyd, who offers the most worked-out version of 
such a view, natural kinds are ‘established through a sort of bicameral linguistic legislature in 
which we and the world jointly legislate’ ([1999], p. 89).  Less metaphorically, the natural kind 
status of a category is determined by an accommodation between what Boyd calls a term’s 
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‘programmatic’ and ‘explanatory’ definitions.  A programmatic definition specifies the causal or 
explanatory role that some body of theory, models, or other scientific practices expects will be 
played by members of a category, often taking the form of a cluster of properties or attributes.  
An explanatory definition then describes the underlying properties or structures common to 
members of that category that explain how the term’s programmatic definition could be at least 
approximately true (or, more generally, how inductive and explanatory practices making use of 
that programmatic definition could be at least approximately successful).   
 On this view, a term names a natural kind in some science when an accommodation can be 
reached, adequate to the needs and standards of that science, between that term’s programmatic 
and explanatory definitions; when there are in fact common causal powers or mechanisms that 
explain how its programmatic definition could be non-accidentally true of the members of its 
extension.  I will hereafter refer to the causal powers or mechanisms found in a natural kind 
term’s explanatory definition as ‘underlying structures’, with two caveats to forestall 
misunderstandings:  1) the relevant structures may be extrinsic with respect to category members 
(such as predation risk) and 2) ‘underlying’ here is understood epistemically rather than 
metaphysically (i.e. HPC theory holds that we may successfully refer to kinds without knowing 
their explanatory definitions, not necessarily that explanatory structures always arise from 
‘lower-level’ sciences or mereological parts).6   
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 For example, it is often assumed that HPC theory requires that the causal mechanisms that 
secure a kind’s programmatic definition must be parts of kind members (in the way H20 
molecules compose samples of water) or from ‘lower level’ sciences (in the way that molecular 
physics is presumed to be a more fundamental science than chemistry).  This assumption is likely 
a holdover from reductionist approaches to kindhood, however, as these are not the senses of 
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 With this terminology in place, we can now distinguish two possible expressions for the 
Similarity Thesis within the HPC framework:  first, members of a kind may be deemed similar 
because they share a cluster of characteristic or surface properties (i.e., the sort that would be 
found in a term’s programmatic definition), and second, members may be deemed similar 
because they possess or are shaped by similar underlying structures (i.e., the sort that would be 
found in a term’s explanatory definition).  These two dimensions of similarity may be assessed 
independently. 
 Particular debates over kinds have too often been cast in absolute terms—either natural kinds 
or bust!—despite nearly all theorists conceding that kindhood comes in degrees.  Perhaps more 
clarity may be achieved by schematically distinguishing different types of challenge to ST, with 
the concession that certain types or degrees of accommodation between a programmatic and an 
explanatory definition will better support a wider range of scientific activities than others.  I 
propose a system of four classes of accommodation, with the latter classes presenting 
increasingly difficult challenges to ST (Figure 2).  In the ideal, limiting case—a ‘Class I’ 
accommodation, which presents no challenge to ST—high surface similarity obtains and is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‘underlying’ required for Boydian accommodation.  For example, evolutionary biologists have 
sometimes expressed surprise that many Batesian mimics only poorly resemble the noxious 
species they are supposedly mimicking.  In a fascinating study, Chittka & Osorio ([2007]) show 
how quirks of generalization patterns in predator learning might actually make imperfect 
mimicry more adaptive.  In other words, predator learning mechanisms might underlie the 
surprising morphological features of a mimic in the relevant sense (serving as the mechanism 
that causally secures and explains them), despite the fact that neither are those learning 
mechanisms a part of the mimic’s body nor is psychology a ‘lower’ science than morphology. 
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explained by the operation of highly similar underlying structures.  A more tenuous ‘Class II’ 
accommodation involves transitional gradation at the surface level of description, but which is 
explicable by modulation of highly similar structures at an underlying level of description.  A 
rougher still ‘Class III’ accommodation involves transitional gradation in both surface properties 
and underlying structures.  Finally, there is yet another challenge of the sort that troubles Craver, 
wherein differing levels of abstraction with which to describe underlying explanatory structures 
favor different kind boundaries at the surface level of description (a ‘Class IV’ accommodation).  
Since Craver ([2009]) has recently written extensively about this kind of challenge—his primary 
case study shows how more or less abstract descriptions of the hippocampus (pictorial images of 
specimens, informational flow diagrams, or computational models) recommend wider or 
narrower extensions for ‘memory’—I will not address it here.  However, there is much to say 
about how it can interact with the other types of challenge in interesting and bewildering ways.
7
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 Some authors have explored even weaker notions of kindhood based on even more extreme 
challenges to accommodation.  For example, Haslam ([2002]) proposes ‘practical kinds’ and 
‘fuzzy kinds’, which would both fall to the right of a Class IV accommodation because neither 
can be characterized by any distinctive form of similarity (surface or underlying).  I do not 
discuss these notions here because I think it unlikely that the subtypes of concepts present this 
deep a challenge to accommodation. 
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Figure 2.  Possible relationships between a property cluster and underlying structures in terms of 
increasingly serious challenges to accommodation arising from transitional gradation between 
two putative kinds A and B.  Circles denote property clusters and gears denote underlying 
structures (‘Ma’ denoting structures that explain A’s characteristic surface properties, Mb 
denoting structures that explain B’s characteristic surface properties, and Mc denoting structures 
the modulation of which can produce either A or B surface properties); overlapping shapes 
indicate degrees of similarity, and size of gears indicates degree of abstraction with which 
structures are described.   
 
 To be clear, the general problem posed by transitional gradation is not that nearby kinds must 
be considered mutually exclusive and that transitional cases between kinds might satisfy the 
criteria for both.  In some cases, there may indeed be some important theoretical reason why 
kinds must be mutually exclusive; concerning species, for example, if too many individuals were 
members of more than one species, then they would join together those two putative species 
through interbreeding. However, this feature is particular to the species problem and emerges 
only because individuation criteria for species happen to involve the same process that 
introduces transitional gradation (namely, interbreeding). Rather, the deeper problem posed by 
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transitional gradation—the problem that generalizes beyond biology—is that where transitional 
gradation proliferates, nature does not provide us with any clear discontinuities that would 
recommend a particular metric of similarity for either kind (whether or not overlapping) as more 
or less natural than a host of other eligible alternatives.  Metaphorically, we reach out to nature to 
feel for a joint and find only smooth continua.  We may cut these continua at particular locations, 
but any particular cut will be arbitrary in the sense that, even with perfect empirical knowledge, 
the cut’s location would remain contestable just to the degree that transitional gradation 
proliferates. In cases of Class III challenge, where we find smooth continua at both surface and 
underlying levels of description, no natural similarity metric can be located, and applying 
similarity-based accounts of kindhood to settle borderline disputes regarding about cases will be 
otiose. 
3. Transitional Gradation in Psychology:  Prototypes and Ideal Models 
 While transitional gradation has received the most attention in philosophy of biology, in this 
section I review evidence that it will also complicate philosophy of psychology by exploring the 
recent debate as to whether concepts form a natural kind.  In particular, I argue that the concepts 
debate will, like the debate over species, be characterized by (1) routine transitional gradation 
that is (2) explanatorily important.  The problem is that learning, like random mutation and 
natural selection, is a process of gradual modification and selection, one in which suitable 
representations are incrementally revised in response to evidence and placed in positions of 
control over appropriate behaviors.  As such, we should expect that transitional gradation in 
representations’ characteristic properties will pose an enduring challenge to the taxonomy of 
learned representations.  Moreover, this variation will be explanatorily important for any project 
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that includes ontogeny in its explanatory purview.  As such, as with species, ST is unlikely to 
resolve major disputes about the taxonomy of concepts. 
 To further narrow our attention, the present case study focuses on prototypes, a particular 
subtype of category representation.  This topic is relevant both as a general test case for the 
application of the theory of kinds to an important posit in psychology and to recent claims of 
Machery ([2009], [2005]), who has argued that concepts are not a natural kind (on the HPC 
account). He holds that to explain human performance on categorization and inference tasks, we 
should eliminate ‘concept’ from psychological theorizing and instead focus directly on 
prototypes, exemplars, and theories.  As mentioned above, however, this approach would lead to 
an eliminative regress if these subcategories are not themselves certified as HPC kinds.  Thus, it 
is imperative for the plausibility of Machery’s position—and the viability of the HPC approach 
to ontological disputes in psychology more generally—that some standard types of category 
representation turn out to be HPC kinds.   
 In defense of claim (1), consider the work of Barsalou, which offers several prima facie 
threats to the conclusion that concepts (especially prototypes) are a natural kind.  He has argued 
that in general prototype and exemplar theories cannot be empirically distinguished (because 
whatever a prototype theory can do at the time of learning, an exemplar theory can do at the time 
of inference—see Barsalou, [1990]) and that their structure is not stable (but rather constructed 
‘on the fly’ in response to particular circumstances—see Barsalou [1987]).  In his book, Machery 
rebuts these particular arguments; I will here focus on extracting a yet deeper challenge from 
Barsalou’s work comparing and contrasting prototypes with ideal models.  Machery ([2009], pp. 
117-118) considers the possibility that ideal models may be a fourth sub-kind of concept.  While 
conceding that the data presented by Barsalou are suggestive, Machery left off the consideration 
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of ideal models there because he felt there had been insufficient empirical work on the subject.  
While this assessment was apt at the time Machery began his critique, ideal models have since 
been studied extensively by a thriving research program.  This program, combined with general 
considerations about the nature of learning canvassed below, require us to take ideal models 
seriously now.   
 Let us then consider that evidence.  Inspired in part by the Wittgensteinian idea that many 
concepts are characterized by ‘family resemblances’ rather than sets of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, prototypes are usually defined as being structured around weighted lists of features, 
none of which are essential for kind membership.  Notably, Rosch and Mervis ([1975]) originally 
characterized prototypes themselves with a property cluster.  Emphasizing that they offer a 
‘description of structural principles’ rather than a ‘processing model’, they identified prototypes 
as analog category representations, exhibiting graded, similarity-based membership, consisting 
of weighted lists of features selected by frequencies of instantiation (relative to other categories), 
and for which no feature or subset of features was essential (with an individual’s category 
membership coming in degrees, as determined by the number and importance of features it 
possesses).   
 However, Barsalou ([1985]) found that subjects’ responses on categorization tasks thought to 
elicit prototypes were also frequently influenced by similarity to an ideal model.  Ideal models 
are structured around ideal rather than typical features—those considered the ‘best’ for the 
category, given some interests or goals.  For example, Barsalou suggests that the ideal ‘foods to 
eat on a diet’ are those with ‘zero calories’, and the ideal ‘things to take from one’s home in a 
fire’ are ‘highest possible value’ ([1985], p. 630). Such ideal values are rarely the most 
frequently instantiated in members of the category, and so these two sorts of category 
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representation would seem to be, focusing merely on their characteristic definitions, distinct 
kinds of representation generated in entirely distinct ways.  If this were right, one would expect 
to find people’s categorization judgments sensitive to typical features for some categorization 
tasks, and to ideal features for another, disjoint set of tasks; and thus (if we consider current 
evidence adequate), Machery’s list of three kinds of category representation would need to be 
expanded to four. 
 Notably, however, the responses of Barsalou’s subjects did not reflect two distinct subsets of 
graded category representations, one organized around typicality and another organized around 
ideality.  Rather, the category representations investigated by Barsalou all seemed to be 
organized around a mixture of the two.  Barsalou ([1985]) investigated the hypothesis that 
representations for goal-derived categories (such as ‘restaurants to eat at’) would be structured 
around ideality, whereas representations for taxonomic categories (such as ‘mammal’) would be 
structured around typicality (central tendency and frequency of instantiation).  While ideality and 
typicality had the greatest influence on the structures of goal-derived and taxonomic categories 
respectively, both were significant predictors of category structure for all kinds of categories 
reviewed.  Moreover, the degree to which typicality or ideality governed a category 
representation’s structure appeared to be a function of, among other things, the types of 
discriminations made and the amount of the subject’s goal-related experience (i.e. on structured 
discrimination tasks evaluable in terms of success or failure and for which feedback about 
success is readily available).  This basic finding has since been confirmed with a variety of 
subjects on a variety of tasks, including tree expert’s judgments on trees (Lynch, Coley, and 
Medin [2000]), U.S. bird experts and Itza Maya foragers on birds (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, 
Medin, and Coley [2002]), experienced fisherman on fish (Burnett, Medin, Ross, and Block 
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[2005]), trained subjects on artificial categories (Levering & Kurtz [2006]), and untrained 
subjects on role-governed categories (Rein, Goldwater, and Markman [2010]).  Moreover, in 
cases where comparisons were possible, ideal features were not invariant but rather relative to 
the types of tasks on which the subjects had specialized (such as the contrast between bird 
experts and foragers found by Bailenson et al. [2002]). 
 If this story is correct, one might wonder why so many other studies on categorization since 
the 1970s did not reveal an influence of ideal features.  Here, we have a ready and plausible 
explanation:  these studies largely focused on the everyday taxonomic categories of university 
undergraduates.  Few studies were performed on experienced subjects or on specialized 
categories, and studies on artificially-learned categories typically included only a minimal 
training phase.  Thus, it is not surprising that the category representations revealed by these 
studies were structured mostly around frequency of instantiation, with the effects of goal-related 
experience having gone unnoticed.    
 These results put pressure on the thesis that prototypes, as defined in terms of typicality, form 
a natural kind.  To connect back to our earlier discussion about ST, we might hope that 
‘prototype’ would name a natural kind in virtue of particular prototypes sharing a similar, 
distinctive category structure—namely, a weighted list of features selected by validity or 
frequency of instantiation.  The problem is that the category representations structured around 
typicality appear to grade smoothly into the category representations structured around ideality 
(through learning), with a significant number of category representations structured around both 
typicality and ideality.  As with a species ring (recall Figure 1), the endpoints of this continuum 
are significantly dissimilar, but the drawing of any specific, similarity-based distinction between 
prototypes and ideal models appears arbitrary (in the sense indicated in Section 2).  Thus, the 
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case of prototypes and ideal models demonstrates the presence of significant transitional 
gradation in psychology.  Below, I argue that this transitional gradation presents at least a Class 
II challenge to accommodation—already a significant challenge to ST—and conclude by 
reviewing preliminary evidence that it actually rises to the level of the even more problematic 
Class III.    
4. The Explanatory Import of Transitional Gradation in Psychology:   
Ontogeny and Expertise 
4.1  The importance of ontogeny 
 In this section, I relate the importance of the transitional gradation between prototypes and 
ideal models to a core project in cognitive science: the study of expertise.  In short, to explain the 
transition from novice to expert we must appeal to the gradual transition in a subject’s domain-
related category representations, as a product of goal-related experience, from prototypes to ideal 
models.  In this sense, the transitional gradation between prototypes and ideal models will be 
explanatorily important to psychology, just as transitional gradation in population members is to 
biology.  Attempts to idealize away from this gradation will fail to support monolithic answers as 
to whether to lump or split sub-categories of concepts in response to challenges, for the cost of 
disregarding this variation would be too great to bear.  
 Let us consider the adequacy of some obvious responses to this transitional gradation 
problem facing the taxonomy of concepts.  The simplest response would be to maintain 
prototypes and ideal models as distinct natural kinds by ignoring or explaining away the 
gradation between them as peripheral to our interests.  But this solution does not seem very 
promising in the case of prototypes and ideal models, for at the very least, a theory of concepts 
ought to make predictions about our categorization decisions, and it cannot do so without 
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specifying the structure of category representations by saying what types of features are most 
important in deciding whether and to what degree new exemplars will be judged members of the 
target category.  This is just what particular accounts of ‘typicality’ and ‘ideality’ specify, so this 
transitional gradation cannot simply be ignored.   
 Nevertheless, one might still hope that prototypes and ideal models could be regarded as 
distinct natural kinds if the borderline cases between them were somehow rare, accidental, or 
unsystematic.  Crucially, I argue, the borderline cases cannot be so regarded for any project that 
includes the acquisition of expertise within its explanatory purview, for here this transitional 
gradation is both systematic and explanatorily important.  Indeed, the possession of specialized 
category representations is regarded as one of the primary distinguishing marks of expertise (see 
Ericsson & Lehman [1996] for a review). In other words, the transitional gradation from 
frequency-based prototypes of novices to the distinctive category representations of experts will 
be, as transitional gradation amongst population members was for speciation, a primary 
explanans of the distinctive features of expert performance.  A robust finding about expertise is 
that it is typically acquired only gradually through extensive, deliberate practice (ten years is a 
frequently cited estimate) on structured problem domains with readily available, accurate 
feedback.  Such deliberate practice gradually produces an incremental specialization of the 
trainees’ conceptual schemes as they attempt to improve their performance on commonly 
practiced tasks.  In short, any view that abstracted away from the gradation between prototypes 
and ideal models would render the acquisition of expert performance a mystery.   
 Let us consider the systematic nature of this gradation in more detail.  A recent consensus in 
the ideal models literature is that central tendency, frequency of instantiation, and ideality are all 
determinants of graded category structure to one degree or another, depending upon several 
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variables such as category exemplar structure, presence of contrasting categories, and especially 
amount of goal-related experience.
8
  Why would greater experience lead to a focus on ideal 
rather than typical features?  The most popular theory holds that repeatedly discriminating 
between competing options on tasks with feedback gradually biases our representations towards 
ideal rather than typical features, since such ideal values minimize prediction error in common 
discrimination tasks.  The error reduction effect arises from the fact that when categories can be 
contrasted along common dimensions, constantly distinguishing between them produces 
‘repelling forces’ between their category representations (Davis & Love [2010]), gradually 
rendering their representations more distinct.  Idealizing, exaggerating, and caricaturing these 
differences will in some conditions support more accurate categorization decisions, because it 
can minimize the perceived similarity between a category representation and the exemplars of 
opposing categories.
9
  Moreover, the ‘direction’ in which the representations migrate will depend 
upon the specific discriminations most frequently made by the learner.   
 The defender of ST might here respond that even if it is granted that prototypes and ideal 
models cannot be regarded as distinct natural kinds, we can still lump them into a new superkind 
of category representation—which I will refer to as ‘C’.  Such lumping would be defensible, the 
                                                          
8
 It is worth noting that while both central tendency and frequency-based measures such as cue 
validity were often grouped together under ‘typicality’, these two measures routinely produce 
distinctly structured category representations and probably should never have been conflated. 
9
 Though theorists do not often go into this level of detail, this argument should be paired with a 
signal detection analysis of tasks reporting relative costs and rates of such as false positives to 
correct identifications.  Caricaturing will typically minimize false positives, but perhaps at the 
cost of losing some correct identifications. 
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thought goes, if we can locate a set of sufficiently numerous and important properties Pc that 
cluster in instances of C to underwrite C’s kindhood without relying on typicality or ideality.   
 This lumping strategy, however, fails for the same reason as the splitting strategy just 
considered: a natural kind’s specification (its ‘programmatic definition’, in Boydian terms) must 
include the set of properties possessed by category members that allow them to play their 
inductive and explanatory role in the science that studies them, which in this case must appeal to 
typicality and ideality.  For example, we might attempt to characterize C as the set of category 
representations structured as weighted lists of features that are normative of category 
membership, without saying anything about how those features are selected.  While this 
specification for C may be appropriate for certain ‘high-level’ explanatory interests (such as 
Weiskopf [2007]) it is problematic for Machery’s purposes, because the psychological models on 
which Machery focuses are crucially concerned with predicting subjects’ categorizations and 
inductions, and we cannot predict subjects’ responses without knowing which features will show 
up in these lists.  The next obvious idea would be to add a disjunctive property to this lumped 
specification of the form ‘typical ˅ ideal’, which would fully capture these features.  However, 
such disjunctive specifications are inimical to similarity, and to admit that they are required to 
capture the most explanatorily-important characteristics of concepts is precisely to abandon the 
idea that all concepts are mutually similar in the first (i.e. surface/programmatic) sense relevant 
to ST.   
 In the language of previous sections, we must conclude that the case of prototypes and ideal 
models presents at least a Class II challenge to accommodation—which is already a significant 
blow to ST.  However, a more subtle form of similarity-based lumping (focusing on the term’s 
‘explanatory definition’) might still be acceptable on a Class II accommodation if we can locate 
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a structure underlying all of Cs instances, Mc, that causally explains the distribution of typical 
and ideal features in category representations—in other words, by conceding surface 
dissimilarity and focusing on similarity in underlying explanatory mechanisms.  
 We are not yet in a position to fully judge the latter license because the most likely source of 
these underlying structures would be neuroscience, and the neuroscience of category learning 
remains unsettled—though there is already some suggestive computational evidence.  
Specifically, the amount of a subject’s goal-related experience appears to be a variable that 
modulates shared underlying learning mechanisms, determining the degree to which these 
mechanisms produce representations structured around typicality or ideality.  Several recent 
computational models of category learning based on the minimization of prediction error suggest 
that this bet may pay off.  Many of these models operate on the idea that a single mechanism 
attempting to minimize category prediction error will emphasize typical features and central 
tendencies on common taxonomic categories with which subjects have smaller amounts of 
experience, but will emphasize ideal values along shared dimensions that allow subjects to 
distinguish options in commonly repeated discriminations (Voorspoels et al. [2011]; Voorspoels 
et al. [2013]).   
 While not strongly vindicating ST about concepts, a Class II accommodation along these 
lines might yet show how the case of concepts is less problematic than the case of species, where 
we also find transitional gradation in underlying explanatory structures (such as genetic 
sequences, epigenetic mechanisms, or environmental pressures). However, there remain two 
sources of pessimism—the first rather strong, the latter more speculative—suggesting that 
gradation between prototypes and ideal models must rise to the level of a Class III challenge to 
accommodation:  evidence that experts develop distinct learning strategies throughout the 
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acquisition of their expertise, and the likelihood that the comparative study of concepts will 
expose transitional gradation in the neurological mechanisms underlying categorization.  Should 
this case rise to the level of a Class III challenge to accommodation, then it will prove fatal to 
ST, for we will not be able to locate any distinctive similarity—surface or underlying—shared 
amongst all prototypes or ideal models.  Before closing, I consider each in turn. 
4.2  Mechanisms underlying expert concepts (in humans) 
 The study of expertise has found that experts not only develop specialized concepts, but also 
that these concepts allow them to iteratively bootstrap qualitatively distinct, specialized learning 
strategies, which in turn enable further gradual specialization of those concepts (see Ertmer & 
Newby [1996] for a review).  Consider familiar examples from the study of chess expertise; 
whereas a chess novice will struggle to learn new strategies by tracking the placements and 
ordering of individual moves, grandmasters perceive games in terms of higher-order memory 
chunks encompassing entire board positions and multi-move sequences, allowing them to learn 
and remember more sophisticated strategies within the same working memory constraints.  
Across dozens of other subject domains, expert learning has similarly been shown to take 
advantage of more organized storage and retrieval of knowledge, increased perceptual and motor 
acuity, and especially distinctive forms of creative exploration and diagnostic engagement with 
training tasks.  Some of these advantages are obvious, such as being able to use background 
theories to diagnose the causes of failure; others are subtler and broader-based, like substantially 
increased motivation, attention, and emotional resilience to training challenges.  Moreover, 
experts can deploy all of these mechanisms more efficiently than the novice, for they are more 
sensitive to task demands, and more flexible in their use of strategies given their enhanced ability 
to deploy metacognitive and metatheoretic representations of tasks and interactions with one’s 
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own abilities, background, strengths, and weaknesses.  In short, the acquisition of expertise 
routinely includes ‘learning how to learn’ in qualitatively distinct ways, with the newly-attained 
concepts and strategies gradually changing the nature of learning many times during the 
acquisition of expertise.  These iteratively developing learning mechanisms constitute significant 
transitional gradation at the level of the underlying mechanisms that explain the transition from 
prototypes to ideal models, and again the gradation itself is required to explain distinctive 
features of expertise. 
 To consider a yet more sophisticated ‘splitting’ objection, the defender of ST might argue 
that this evidence reveals that experts do not actually iteratively improve their novice concepts, 
but rather gradually lose their novice concepts and replace them with new and distinct expert 
concepts.  This rebuttal does not, however, rest on a viable interpretation of the empirical 
evidence in this area. This point has already been somewhat illustrated through the discussion of 
the computational models that predict the gradual revision of novice prototypes into expert ideal 
models, but the defender of ST might argue that these models operate at a level of abstraction 
which obscures the emergence of distinct expert concepts.  To further argue against this 
objection, I end the discussion of the expertise literature by showing how two other independent 
lines of research on strong candidates for qualitatively distinct expert concepts—configural rules 
and higher-order concepts—still illustrate the importance of transitional gradation in concept 
learning.   
 In the judgment and decision-making literature, an expert is said to categorize using a 
configural rule when the impact of one variable is highly-dependent upon the values of other 
cues in context (see Camerer & Johnson [1991] for a review).  Configural rule theory is 
consistent with the idea that experts use graded category structures like a prototypes or ideal 
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models, but where the specific weightings of the cues is highly context-sensitive.  The configural 
rules of experts have been found to differ significantly from the categorization techniques of 
novices, in that experts decide on the basis of fewer cues, use more context-sensitive weightings, 
focus more on causal cues, and use more ‘broken-leg’ cues (which are rare but highly-diagnostic 
of category membership, again echoing a theme of the ideal models literature).  There is, 
however, no evidence that at any point in the acquisition of expertise learners suddenly switch 
from naïve prototypes to expert configural rules.  Rather, research has shown that these 
distinctive features of expert categorization emerge gradually by ‘trying to fit increasingly 
sophisticated general rules to past cases’ (Camerer & Johnson, [1991], p. 208).  In other words, 
they are iteratively built by applying and gradually modifying the conceptual structures of 
novices in response to evidence of success or failure on prior tasks.  There is no way to make 
sense of these iterative revisions except by reference to the previous knowledge structures and 
their successes or failures on decision tasks.  The proposed splitting interpretation is thus not 
viable here, as again we only find more transitional gradation. 
 On the other hand, it is obvious that experts in many domains do acquire some genuinely 
new concepts, for they routinely deploy specialized technical vocabulary.  One of the most 
thoroughly studied domains featuring such vocabulary is medical diagnostics.  Research on 
expert diagnosticians reveals an apparent challenge to the ubiquity of transitional gradation in 
psychology, for psychologists have discovered violations of the traditional idea that the 
hallmarks of expertise emerge monotonically as a linear function of expertise level (as originally 
suggested by the classic studies of chess expertise conducted by De Groot [1946/1978]).  
Boshuizen and Schmidt have found evidence that qualitatively distinct categorization strategies 
were favored by novice, intermediate, and expert physicians (see Rikers, Schmidt, and 
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Boshuizen [2002] for a review).  In particular, novice medical students appear to categorize on 
the basis of a few surface cues emerging from ‘a limited understanding of biomedical knowledge 
and a lay type of clinical knowledge’ (Rikers et al. [2002], p28), intermediates on the basis of 
‘extensive biomedical knowledge [involving specific anatomical or causal 
information]…acquired through individual study and lectures’ (Rikers et al. [2002], p28), and 
experts on the basis of specialized clinical concepts, with biomedical propositions appearing to 
play little explicit role in their reasoning.  When asked to justify their diagnoses in speak-aloud 
protocols, these expert physicians favored technical terms unrecognizable to novices, such as 
‘aorta-insufficiency, backward failure, cyanosis, endocarditis, hepatolienaomegaly, or 
hyperhidrosis’ (Rikers et al. [2002], p. 29). 
 While this finding of three qualitatively distinct categorization strategies at different levels of 
expertise might appear to challenge the ubiquity of transitional gradation in the study of expert 
concepts, a careful examination shows that it actually presumes and supports it.  While many 
concepts that feature in expert reasoning are not at all possessed by novices, this is entirely 
consistent with the claim that experts retain many of the concepts they possessed as novices, 
which have been extensively revised and elaborated through gradual iterative revision just as 
indicated above.  In fact, Boshuizen and Schmidt’s studies of these distinctive expert concepts 
show that they can only be properly understood in terms of their relations to the concepts of 
novice and intermediate learners.  When probed, for example, these expert clinicians were able 
to articulate the reasoning behind these concepts, which generally took the form of a series of 
inferences involving clinical and biomedical concepts.
10
  In other words, the specialized expert 
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 For example, note the mixture of anatomical information and clinical inferences from one 
physician who justified a diagnosis of endiocarditis in the following terms:  ‘The patient is a 
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concepts are really encapsulated clusters of concepts and inferences available to novices and 
intermediate learners, but which have gradually become tacit through extensive practice.  
Moreover, these encapsulated knowledge structures are deployed to issue diagnoses involving 
the very same categories as those of the novices and intermediates—such as, heart disease, liver 
disease, diabetes, or stroke.   
 This all bolsters the importance of transitional gradation, for the highly-specialized 
knowledge structures deployed by experts compose much larger conceptual structures used to 
place cases in these familiar categories in a much more sophisticated and context-sensitive 
manner. In the case of both configural rules and encapsulated technical concepts, a close 
examination of the data does not reveal discrete breaks in learning that could cleave expert from 
novice concepts in a principled way.  Rather, it reveals only deeper interdependence between 
novice and expert concepts, and yet more complex transitional gradation.   
4.3  Mechanisms underlying animal concepts 
 Finally (and more speculatively), if we take a comparative perspective on the study of 
concepts—if we think that conceptual abilities evolved and are possessed to greater or lesser 
degrees by a variety of non-human animals—it is likely that we will see transitional gradation in 
relevant underlying mechanisms derived from the transitional gradation through the phyletic 
record.  Of course, the evolutionary emergence of ‘conceptual abilities’ remains a contentious 
question, and a number of researchers either hold that animals do not possess human-like 
concepts or that it is not yet clear how to empirically study the concepts they possess (Chater & 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
young man with a high fever who presents a septic syndrome. This suggests drug use. He shows 
signs of thromboemboli, due to an affected heart valve. The tachycardia fits with an associated 
aorta vitium’ (Schmidt & Boshuizen [1992], p. 275). 
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Heyes [1994]).  Furthermore, there are systematic differences in the animal literature that render 
the particular consensus of the human concepts literature elusive:  comparative psychology 
favors different taxonomic divisions (such as perceptual, associative, relational, and analogical 
concepts), distinct experimental paradigms (for example an emphasis on associative learning and 
same-different tasks), fewer mathematical models, and more learning principles (see Zentall et 
al. [2007] for a review).  However, concepts are now studied in organisms separated from 
humans by as much evolutionary time as honeybees (Giurfa et al. [2001]; Chittka & Jensen 
[2011]), and unless we tie concepts tightly to a uniquely human trait like language, it is likely 
that such abilities emerged gradually over evolutionary time and will be exhibited to greater or 
lesser degrees by different species with different underlying neural mechanisms.   
 Many forms of variation have already been found in animal conceptual abilities, and 
correspondingly many forms of variation in underlying neural mechanisms that may explain 
these differences.  Species should be expected to differ in the type and number of features they 
can associate with categories and how easily they can learn about them, as well as in relevant 
supporting capacities such as perceptual acuity, memory, and motivation.  Some of these 
differences between species may be relatively sharp—such as an ability or inability to master 
higher-order analogical relations (Thompson & Oden [2000]; Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli 
[2008]).  Others appear transitional in the more problematic sense, like differences in the 
number, type, order, context-sensitivity, or degree of abstraction in relations that can be 
learned—differences that appear to emerge gradually in the phyletic record due to gradual 
changes in relative amounts of brain tissue devoted to the neocortex or hippocampus (Güntürkün 
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[1981]; Basil et al. [1996]).
11
  Animals may also differ in their ability to structure categories by 
features regarded as typical (Jitsumori [1994]; Dépy, Fagot, & Vauclair [1997]) or essential 
(Philips, Shankar, and Santos [2010]).  Finally, there is some evidence that animals themselves 
may demonstrate some of the expertise effects just mentioned (Helton [2008])—though perhaps 
not those that depend upon the more elaborate forms of metacognitive awareness and explicit 
representation of task demands, which probably do depend upon language (Carruthers [2008]).  
Some of these lines of comparative investigation are still preliminary, but there is already enough 
evidence that a defender of the Similarity Thesis should confront it.  
 At any rate, if transitional gradation in the mechanisms underlying conceptual abilities is 
found to proliferate in the study of expertise or in comparative psychology, then the case of 
concepts must rise at least to the level of a Class III challenge to accommodation.  In this 
eventuality, ST will not help us settle borderline disputes about concepts, for nature will not 
provide us with clear discontinuities—at either the surface or underlying levels of description—
that could help us identify non-arbitrary metrics of similarity characterizing subtypes of 
concepts.  ST should here be entirely abandoned, and we must move to an alternative perspective 
concerning the theory of kinds’ role in these disputes. 
5. Conclusion 
 I have here discussed the general tension between the traditional idea that natural kinds are 
united by a distinctive form of similarity (ST) and the metaphysical phenomenon of transitional 
gradation.  I argued that the problem of transitional gradation extends beyond the confines of 
biology, where it has most been acknowledged, to central areas of psychology where it has been 
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 There is some evidence that the relevant gradations found in the acquisition of human 
expertise may also be found in animals—see Helton ([2008]). 
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little acknowledged until now.  While I have focused on the study of concepts, the sorts of 
gradual adaptation and iterative bootstrapping found in concept learning are likely to be 
organizing principles in (at least) all of the life sciences, and these principles introduce 
transitional gradation fundamentally at odds with the appeal to similarity with which the search 
for kinds began.  Moreover, such transitional gradation is likely to be found in any gradually 
modified representational state, which encompasses a large swathe of psychology’s subject 
matter.  Though some theorists of kinds reject this appeal to similarity entirely (Magnus [2011]), 
such a move requires substantial conceptual redeployment, and those hoping to use the theory of 
kinds to settle taxonomic disputes in the life sciences should plan accordingly. 
 As a final call for increased caution, I suggest that the problem with ideal models is probably 
just the tip of the iceberg in terms our category representations’ transitional plasticity.  The same 
appeals to the adaptability of expertise could as well recommend transitions to yet other types of 
feature depending upon what expertise in that domain requires the learner to master.  For 
example, other studies have revealed that experts’ categories can also gravitate towards deep 
causal structure when such structure best predicts category membership (Rottman, Gentner, & 
Goldwater [2012]).  Moreover, increasingly popular Bayesian models of category learning also 
highlight the importance of intermediate structures in category learning by construing 
categorization as probability density estimation and taking learners to iteratively develop 
conceptual clusters by continually updating probability estimations as new stimuli are 
encountered (Griffiths et al. [2007]).
12
  This particular Bayesian model also suggests transitional 
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 Of course, one might object that Bayesian approaches cannot provide a model of underlying 
mechanisms of categorization, given that pure Bayesian inference is not computationally 
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gradation between prototypes and exemplars, given its prediction that subjects will display 
prototype-like judgments early in training and exemplar-like judgments later in training—
explaining this influential but puzzling behavioral finding from Smith & Minda ([1998]).  These 
new models all enable a variety of predictions about gradual changes found in the trajectory of 
concept learning that were beyond the purview of previous theories, but which now must be 
taken seriously.  The general problem—good for organisms with brains, bad for the theory of 
kinds—is that, as with mutation and gene exchange in natural selection, learning endows us with 
a powerful form of iterative, open-ended adaptability, and the structure of our category 
representations will ultimately demonstrate as much diversity as the types of environmental 
relationships that we are able to learn to track. 
 Before closing, it is worth noting that none of the arguments here establish that categories 
vulnerable to gradation are wholly arbitrary or useless, or that they should be eliminated from 
psychology.  We should, as Machery urges, stop thinking that concepts are all alike, but if we 
reject the assumption that only similarity-based kinds are valid subjects for science, then concept 
eliminativism no longer follows.  As some have suggested, ‘concept’ may instead name a 
‘practical kind’ whose use is determined pragmatically through experimental or clinical practice 
(Haslam [2002]), or concepts may yet be amenable to pluralist or promiscuous approaches that 
allow context-sensitive category membership conditions and/or cross-classification by multiple 
incommensurable taxonomies (Weiskopf [2007]; Dupré [1996]; Craver [2009]; Rice [2014]).  
Concepts may be united not by synchronic similarities but rather by historical relations or 
transitional processes (Millikan [1999])—so long as we abandon the hope that these relations 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tractable; but such models typically rely on more plausible approximate inference algorithms that 
are biologically feasible. 
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will secure significant inductive generalizations holding for all concepts.  The arguments here 
simply establish that membership in any such kinds cannot be univocally fixed by non-arbitrary 
metrics of similarity, and that attempts to settle their borderlines by appeal to such natural 
metrics is likely to end in frustration.  The more general moral is that psychology should move 
instead towards a broader, model-based perspective that aims to predict and explain the full 
range of variation in conceptual abilities as functions of variables like amount and type of goal-
related experience, informational structure of the domain, context, and general psychological 
resources like memory, motivation, and attention. 
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